Proliferation, Starlink, and Desired Countermeasures
Proliferated constellations in low earth orbit (LEO) have demonstrated significant battlefield utility in the Russia-Ukraine war and are likely to continue serving as an important component of space power in wartime. How Chinese leaders view these continued developments will have important implications for managing military escalation in space.
The authors of a new RAND report draw on open-source literature across the Chinese defense enterprise to assess People’s Liberation Army (PLA) perspectives of LEO as a warfighting domain and the systems being deployed in LEO. The authors highlight Starlink as an influential development shaping Chinese views of LEO to contextualize their findings.
Key Findings
- PLA observers of the United States assume an extremely high degree of coordination between U.S. policy, military doctrine, and commercial development.
- The PLA takes Starlink as a model for the capabilities it wants to develop in or regarding LEO.
- PLA researchers assess that the United States reached an inflection point in space power around 2020, after which they assess that the United States was eager to “give space warfare a try.”
- Proliferated constellations such as Starlink directly and significantly undermine the PLA’s preferred method of conducting operations.
- The PLA’s threat perceptions are inflated by its tendencies to exaggerate and catastrophize U.S. capabilities, leading to assessments and potential responses that prepare for the worst possibilities even before evidence indicates such.
- PLA responses to new U.S. capabilities in space are driven by perceived threats to the PLA’s ability to conduct operations, fear of falling behind in U.S.-China competition, and exaggerated assessments of U.S. capabilities.
- China has designated a national priority of developing Project SatNet, a proliferated LEO megaconstellation intended to function as “China’s Starlink.”
Recommendations
- U.S. Department of Defense planners should avoid attempts to manage Chinese threat perceptions in ways that impose costs on U.S. budgets, acquisition timelines, or operational readiness.
- The U.S. Space Force should anticipate and develop policies for addressing an environment in which the PLA believes it can prosecute more provocative operations against the United States without risk of escalation.
- The U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Space Force should anticipate and be prepared to counter disinformation campaigns directed toward both government and commercial U.S. assets.
